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‘Evaluating’ Microfinance: Academic irrelevance 
 
Abstract 
The choice of Microfinance (MF) by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as the 
primary means of poverty alleviation should have brought clarity to the role and 
functioning of MF, but instead it seems to have generated a fog. It is desirable to take a 
fresh look and start from first principles to clear the air. Microfinance is micro finance---
it is finance writ small. If finance works, microfinance works. Much of the difficulty has 
been created by academics and arises from scholars treating MF as though it is some new 
economic phenomenon. With a series of specific questions, and with the Bangladeshi 
case in mind,it will be argued  that many of the interesting and constructive questions 
have not been on the research agenda. Instead, the attempt to rely on randomized 
controlled trials is serving to distract. 
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I Introduction: clarifying the issues 
The choice of Microfinance (MF) by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as the 
primary means of poverty alleviation should have brought clarity to the role and 
functioning of MF, but instead it seems to have generated a fog. It is desirable to take a 
fresh look and start from first principles to clear the air
1
. While modern Microfinance 
began in the 1970’s it has blossomed into a global movement since the 1990’s.   Some 
$25 billion are loaned to 125 million borrowers in 130 countries. This astounding success 
of Microfinance in a span of about thirty years has attracted the attention of olicymakers, 
development economists and social thinkers all over the world, and rightly so.   
To begin with, Microfinance is micro finance---it is finance writ small. If finance works, 
microfinance works; if finance does not work, perhaps we should begin with dismantling 
the banks for the rich, not those for the poor. Much of the difficulty has been created by 
academics and arises from scholars treating MF as though it is some new economic 
phenomenon.
2
  I will suggest, with a series of specific questions and with the Bangladeshi 
case in mind, that most of the interesting and constructive questions have not been on the 
research agenda.  
The first and most important question is the productivity of micro enterprise.  As long as 
small-scale activities have rates of return above 25-35 percent, the range of interest rates 
charged by most Microfinance institutions (or MFI’s), microfinance can do undoubted 
good. Keeping in mind that the primary issue is finance leads us to more productive 
comparisons, such as small business success in the USA, such as the MFI’s that are 
conducted for profit, and on the integration of MFI’s with commercial banking. 
Secondly, MF may contribute even when there is no change in GDP and even if there are 
negligible changes in poverty and unemployment. If changes in market structure are 
desirable and need to be fostered, then MF is beneficial since it can change market 
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structure by empowering the poor. 
Thirdly, MF is linked with interesting and worthwhile ancillary issues, such as female 
empowerment, but these do nothing to contradict the fundamental economic logic of the 
situation. Many of these purported benefits are social changes and inter-temporal effects--
-putting numbers on these effects is hard. There is something to be said for the following 
position: Poverty is not just an economic condition but also a self-reinforcing 
psychological state. As such, one has to tackle the culture of poverty. Persuading people 
to change is hard and often thankless.  
Fourthly, since all the estimates performed hitherto use MFI data, they are really 
estimates of the effect of MFI's and not of MF per se---this may be too fine a point for 
policy makers but it can be an important caveat for evaluations of MF, since MFI’s can 
change their role even while their name stays unchanged. 
Fifthly, these estimates assume that the practical details of MF, of the practice of the 
MFI's, and of the context in which they operate, have all remained substantially static. In 
Bangladesh, the only country for which I can speak with some confidence, these changes 
are potentially of the first order of importance. Instead of paying more attention to 
context, randomized controlled trials  or RCT’s for short, have come to the fore in the 
analysis of poverty , and hence of MF. If the argument presented here is correct, this is a 
mistake. There really are important issues to consider and so much focus upon tertiary 
issues serves to distract. 
Finally, before talking about policy in the conclusion, it is well to get a point about 
personalities out of the way. MF today is inextricably linked with Bangladesh and with 
the name Muhammad Yunus. The reputation of Modern MF has a best friend and a worst 
enemy---and they are both the same person, Nobel laureate Yunus. Only those who have 
seen or lived through the devastation of the early 1970’s in Bangladesh will be able to 
feel how important it was to have hope---and the Grameen Bank gave hope. With the 
greatest of admiration for the achievements of Yunus and Grameen I must gasp when he 
speaks of putting poverty ‘in the museum’ through MF, and of credit as being a ‘right’.3 
While I firmly believe that MF is beneficial, I even more firmly believe that MF is a 
method of poverty alleviation, and, by itself, not the means of economic growth.    
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Section II deals with the first and second issues noted above, i.e. with short-run 
profitability and entrepreneurship. Section III deals with the third issue above by noting 
the considerable difficulties involved in embedding MF evaluations within a multi-period   
general equilibrium framework. Section IV considers the fourth issue above and points 
out the importance of distinguishing MFI evaluation from MF effects. Section V 
criticizes the use of randomized trials by the close reading of the two most quoted  papers 
of this genre. Generally speaking, a randomized trial attempts to insulate the agents of 
interest from all irrelevant social effects and then subjects them to the desired experiment. 
Whether this can be plausibly done at all depends on the experiment in question and the 
society. Abhijit Banerjee and Angus Deaton have debated the use of RCT’s recently.  
Fortuitously, Banerjee chose MF as his example for the value of RCT, thereby making 
this critique more topical
4
. Section II lays out the root economic questions faced in 
evaluating MF. Since many ancillary questions have come to accompany any discussion 
of MF, sections III and IV provide additional context before criticizing RCT’s in Section 
V
5
. 
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II. Profitability and Entrepreneurship 
The general shortcoming of the current wave of criticism is that it proves too much-----if 
MF does not work, neither does finance.  For finance to be beneficial there have to be 
viable business opportunities. We need to begin by asking, are there productive small 
enterprises? In conducting the first study of Urban Microfinance in Bangladesh, careful 
attention was given to the activities supported by MF. Table 1 shows the estimated profits 
of such activities. If the data is even partially credible, it is clear that small amounts of 
money can be very profitably used. Since the data are central to my claim, it is worth 
discussing it in more detail.  The data was prospective, showing expected profits, and was 
so important that the profit rates were re-checked by asking other established enterprises 
firms the following question “ Do you find the following data to be realistic?”. The 
respondents said that, in general, the capital was lower than needed and so were the 
estimated profits. The profit rates remained almost unchanged. This exercise was 
repeated a year later, in 2011. Again, the first results were verified with minor changes. 
Finally, a former entrepreneur who had changed to wage work, was asked about the 
general reliability of the Table. He found some profit rates too high and others too low. 
The role of unpaid family labor can, and should, also be raised. In calculating ‘profits’ in 
the Table, the respondents did not evaluate the shadow cost of their time. If Bangladesh is 
considered a surplus labor economy, this shadow wage should be quite low, both for the 
owner and for family helpers. For several of the enterprises indicated, the helpers make 
little difference to the calculation. As for the owners actual imputed profit, let readers 
make their own guess. But even after all changes, I will claim that every ‘profit’ rate---
meaning return on capital invested--- exceeded 100 per cent, and that profits after 
imputing some value to the owners labor exceeded 50 per cent. This is all that is needed 
for the case to be made.  
In addition to this general Table, I have closely studied the rickshaw industry for many 
years. If one buys an old rickshaw for 7000, it can be rented out for 70 per day. So the 
yearly rental amounts to at least 24,500, and over the three year life of the rickshaw will 
earn 73,500. Even after discounting at 10%, this provides a present value return of 66,000 
on an investment of 7000
6
. How can one doubt the productivity of small loans?
7
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While I have spoken only of Bangladesh above, that there are many profitable MFI’s, 
particularly in Latin America, shows much the same fact
8
. Why do the critics not admit 
that the existence of so many sustainable MFI’s clearly shows that here is a market that 
the profit motive overlooked?  Is the MFI self-sustaining? If so, then our concern should 
be minimal. It is ‘just another’ private enterprise. Do we demand of furniture makers that 
their chairs or beds are good for our necks or our backs---or do we let the consumers talk 
with their choices? As a result of this deflection of focus, insufficient attention is being 
paid to some really interesting questions, such as the seamless integration of MFI’s into 
commercial banking?  
The surprise is that the productivity of small loans has not been widely expected since it 
is entirely in line with neoclassical dogma. The production function used for most growth 
theory requires the ‘Inada condition’, which posits the marginal product of capital to 
become infinite as capital goes to zero---in words, that very small amounts of capital are 
incredibly productive---and this is what the data shows
9
. 
If we get over the mental block that seems to characterize MF as ‘something different’, 
we get to the more productive approach of setting standards for MF from the best 
functioning markets we can see. The Small Business Administration of the USA tells us 
that only 80% of new businesses survive the first  year in the USA. I have been unable to 
acquire a breakdown by size, but since most new enterprises are small, how is it that 97% 
can survive a year in Bangladesh while only 80% can survive in the USA?
10
  
Secondly, much concern has been exhibited over the obvious scale and market limits to 
MF. How many baskets can a market absorb? How many tamales? Hence, critics urge, all 
MF is inherently limited. Perhaps. A more productive approach will relate the products to 
the elasticity of demand. With  elastic demands, higher MF production  will lower prices 
but increase revenues. So MF will benefit the economy when it increases efficiency for 
goods with elastic demands and, as will be argued below, MF will also provide for more 
equitable redistribution of incomes. Similarly, people ask why MF beneficiaries require 
‘continual help’, meaning why clients continue to use MFI financing. Comparable figures 
for small businesses in the USA show that they also tend to maintain continuing relations 
with the same bank. Do some of the MFI beneficiaries become rich? Maybe, maybe not. 
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But what are the comparable figures for small business in the USA? We do not ask banks 
to create entrepreneurs, only to give them a chance; there is no reason why we should ask 
for more from a MFI
11
.  
In the CBS 60 Minutes segment of 1989 that propelled Grameen to international fame, 
we see a lady called Sufia Khatun who is the first borrower from Grameen. She made 
bamboo stools for a net profit of 2c a day. By giving her a loan of $7 and enabling her to 
escape the middlemen, Grameen caused her profits to shoot up to $1.20 per day. These 
are very impressive numbers, but what is the impact upon the GDP? Let us assume Sufia 
made as many stools before the loan and after. Since the same production is brought to 
the market, there will be no change in either total supply or in price. So the net impact on 
GDP is zero. If the middleman who supplied Sufia is able to continue we have no change 
in employment either; otherwise we can actually have a decrease in employment. 
Nonetheless, the world was enthralled by the story of Sufia
12
. And rightly so. If the 
market is to function well, those who work hard should reap the results of their labor. 
This is the only way growth can be encouraged. So even a loss of employment need not 
reduce our admiration for MF. At this point sociologists might wish to point out that 
looking only at averages can mislead if the outliers---those like Sufia---are setting 
entrepreneurial examples, so that we need to look beyond the usual figures when we 
evaluate MF 
One figure that is often mentioned is the interest rate. Curiously, what should be one of 
the strongest arguments for MF has turned out to be one of the prime weapons for the 
opposition. The fact that MF interest rates are in the region of 35% has led people to call 
MFI’s ‘parasites’ and ‘exploiters’. High or low in such cases has to be relative to some 
standard. The critics take the bank interest rate of 12-15% as their standard. However, no 
one, even the critics, pretends that the poor can actually get a loan from the bank. Why it 
is even relevant to mention the bank interest rate when bank loans are impossible to 
obtain is hard to figure---perhaps it is just an indication of the depth of animus against 
MF. Since the poor cannot get these bank loans, the proper way to refer to the facts is that 
the interest rate for the poor is infinite. The more important comparison is with interest on 
loans actually available to the rural poor. Such loans are available to the poor, but at rates 
10 
 
in excess of 100%. The fact that the normal interest rate prevalent in Bangladeshi villages 
today is that set by the MFI’s is a point of under-reported importance. It is not that village 
moneylending no longer exists, just that it has become a marginalized activity.  
13
 
Having mentioned sociology once, it can be observed that, socially and psychologically,  
the entry of a MFI into a village is similar to a Multinational Corporation coming into a 
LDC. Productivity improvements in a village are then the equivalent of what is called 
‘technology transfer’ Instead of the stream of regressions dealing with the ‘impact’ of MF 
upon villages it is high time that more structured studies were made to examine how 
villages react to the culture shock of MFI entry, what characteristics mark the villages 
that adapt successfully and how we can ease the process of productivity improvements 
and financial innovation.
14
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III Impact on Economy, Society and the future 
There are two points to be observed in measuring the economic impact of MF
15
. First to 
look at borrowers before and after they get MF and next we need to compare those within 
MF with those without. The first step is easier to do, because it involves only those 
belonging to the MFI; the second is much harder, because it involves those not under 
your scrutiny. This is the method of double differences. The crucial assumption is that 
control and member groups are otherwise comparable. In order to get empirical data, we 
look at the situations over time of various households, some having MF and the others 
not. But the Households that choose MF may be systematically different from those who 
do not, so we have self-selection; and the villages where MF is offered may be 
systematically different---why were they chosen? Hence a clean empirical study is hard 
without actually engaging in a theory of Household choice and a theory of  MFI  
operation. No study that has hitherto been done on MF has paid attention to this 
question
16
. 
To engage in a useful comparison the data points have to be separated in time. But the 
surrounding economy may not have been standing still. How have the above HH’s and 
MFI’s reacted to the changed environment? This may end up being the most significant 
neglected factor since the influence of the external economy may well dominate both 
household choice as well as MFI activity. Two factors of enormous importance for 
Bangladesh are the growth of the Readymade Garments industry and the inflow of 
Remittances from Bangladeshis abroad. Remittances have risen from .2 billion in 1981 to 
1.7 billion in 1999 to 9 billion in 2009, while Garments have grown from 3 millions in 
1981 to 866 million in 1990 to 4860 m in 2000 to 10,500 m in 2009. The impact of the 
Garments industry has been much noticed, particularly the change it has wrought in 
social attitudes to female labor, but that of Remittances is still being studied. I myself 
have been visiting a village over the last twenty years which has been totally transformed 
by its overseas workers. Of some 4000 people, about one in five works abroad. The 
weekly collection at the mosque used to be under Tk1000 in the 1990’s; today it exceeds 
Tk 30,000. 
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If we try to measure only the short-run impact of MF, we find it to be hard because of a 
variety of confounding effects. One seldom has an adequate panel data set. A study for 
Chile that provided answers to questions very similar to the impact of MF was conducted 
on the effectiveness of SME training. But it took a 14-year panel to establish the 
effectiveness .
17
 
The longer run impact of MF has been less explored , but is central to integrating MF 
with national economic policy. If MF is profitable, then of course it contributes to the 
GDP and to economic growth. But even if MF is unprofitable at current prices, it can still 
raise future economic potential through investments in health and education? While such 
questions have been raised and positive answers given in other contexts, there has been 
little attention paid to it in the context of MF
18
. 
A second question, that has virtually remained unasked, arises naturally when one 
recognizes the extreme failure of market prerequisites in 1974. Perhaps we should turn 
the logic of markets upside down and start by asking how people would behave if all the 
major markets, for labor, credit and goods did not exist in the usual sense but each 
transaction was based on an individual bargain? This would make the following question 
relevant: If MF does not contribute directly to growth, does it provide for market stability 
and serve as a buffer against catastrophic failure
19
. 
 Does MF serve to smooth out markets by preventing monopoly effects, thereby 
enabling the market sector? 
 Are there poverty traps that prevent market mechanisms from enabling the poor? 
 Can MF activities be seen as ensuring the survival condition needed for a general 
equilibrium? What are the welfare properties of such a ‘moral economy’? 
 Can the awareness and ‘voice’ created by MF programs help political 
participation and hence make for a more stable market economy? 
 
It is curious that similar questions have been asked and answered when discussing 
international finance, but the application to MF has yet to be made
20
. 
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IV Evaluating MF or MFI?  
It has been argued above that MF has been too closely studied by using the multiple 
claims made for MF by the MFI’s, and that this has hindered our view of the process 
primarily as finance. Closely related to the above is the failing of economists to see that 
MFI’s themselves change over time. MFI’s are filled with practitioners constantly 
grappling with real problems, who are quite ready to change as circumstances arise, 
without worrying about the clarity of the tracks they leave behind for academics. Since 
virtually all the data we use is largely generated by MFI’s, we may need to separate the 
evaluation of MF from that of MFI’s. This requires theorizing about MFI formation and 
behavior.  
The practice of the MFI’s  is constantly morphing. The MFI officials are ready to turn on 
a dime if they find more effective policies and alter their loan policies, certainly in 
practice if not on paper .In other words, differences between MFI’s can be significant and 
so can variations over time within the same MFI. This is messy for economists, who 
would like to keep their analytical lines clear and data sources unambiguous, but it is a 
reality that cannot be avoided.
21
.The MFI’s are not homogeneous, so why should their 
data always represent purposeful behavior? This is a caveat that has been largely ignored 
in the evaluative studies. Are we evaluating the MF movement or the MFI’s as 
institutions? 
Critics can argue that MF runs well just by using the enthusiasm and `dedication of youth 
for 2 years, after which they burn out. If true. since the idealism of Youth is a renewable 
resource, it can even be considered an economical strategy. It also suggests that MF’s 
must necessarily become weaker even as they succeed---the flame burns low, enthusiasm 
wanes, less motivated members and weakly motivated staff take effective control of an 
organization.  
The importance of this issue, the internal evolution of MFI’s, can be realized by looking 
at two of the best recognized aspects of MF, the participation of women and group 
lending. Both arose from experience in the field and neither was thought of to start with. 
If economists had ‘evaluated’ Grameen in 1978, we would not have known of either 
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characteristic! In 1987 BRAC had a different, and more controlling, strategy for the 
disbursal of loans. Upon seeing the success of the Grameen group lending model, BRAC 
quietly adopted it in the 1990’s. Such changes in modalities, with potentially significant 
consequences, may have gone on several times during the operation of the MFI’s. It is 
hard to be sure. This time it is the secretiveness of the MFI’s about their operations and 
their jealousy about the details of their data that is largely to blame. 
Since support for MF boils down to support for MFI’s in practice, this last point is an 
important one for policy purposes, and worth illustrating in more detail. In an earlier 
section it was shown that the first client of Grameen, ‘Sufia’, need not be a case of GDP 
growth. Is this representative of MFI activity? If so, then MF may only be causing 
beneficial redistribution. But consider an alternative. CITI gives Microentrepreneurship 
awards every year. In 2008 the MFI’s [or NGO’s as they are more often called] gave 
awards to three ladies:  
Sabina Begum won the award for her contribution to making waste fabric useful. 
This is Cost saving 
Baby Chakma got the award for her success in livestock farming and biogas and 
organic-fertilizer production. This is new product innovation. 
Salma Akter won the award by making bobbin and shuttle for handloom industry 
by using waste plastic and polyphone. This is process innovation 
 
If we gather the three prizes together and consider the cumulative impact of cost saving, 
product innovation and process innovation we should see why MFI ‘s consider their role 
in a more positive light than that cast by ‘evaluations’. 
The structure of the MFI’s, as a new service industry, is worth consideration. While most 
questions have focused upon two questions---the interest rate charged by the MFI’s  and 
their financial sustainability , these are only parts of  some more complex economic 
questions relating to industrial organization, such as concentration ratios, potential 
competition and regulation
22
. Perhaps it is time to consider the possibility that MFI 
interest rates are not motivated by profits but rather set on a cost-plus basis? The reason 
they cannot go lower lies in the functions any viable financial office must perform---
15 
 
avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard, providing monitoring and the enforcement 
of contracts. The MFI’s bring these services to the borrowers doorstep. If these essential 
functions can be more cheaply done, let us have a study that shows us how. 
16 
 
V The RCT alternative 
The most favored methods of analysis today consist of randomized experiments, or RCT 
for short
23
. The appreciation of history and the importance of contextual analysis are two 
points that have been stated so often in the course of this critique that I will not repeat 
them.That randomized trials will only supplement policies otherwise suggested should be 
clear from my emphasis upon first principles and upon context. In a country like 
Bangladesh, where some 30 million have been associated with Microfinanace, where, in 
most poor areas, it is difficult to find the handful who have not been clients at some point, 
such experiments seem extremely hard to design for their internal validity and pointless 
for their external validity. By referring to the practice of the hard sciences and setting up 
R A Fisher and Jerzy Neyman as predecessors, the new experimentalists have set 
themselves the highest standards. There should be no soil on their work. A close reading 
of the two attempts to do ‘experimental’ work on Microfinance shows that this is hardly 
the case
24
.  
The paper of Karlan and Zinman on an RCT in Manila has been published in Science. 
How well does such a publication to live up to the ‘gold standard’ motto that the new 
experimentalists have accepted for themselves. Several parts of the method are truly 
innovative and worthwhile, in particular, the use of credit scoring to help select samples 
to be studied for the impact of Microfinance. The claims for scientific rigor, however, 
apply largely to intent, not to execution. Needless to add, this may just be the nature of 
the beast. How does one pull out a sample from a society and yet have them behave 
credibly? It suggests is that randomized evaluations may work well for ‘marginal’ 
actions, like mail order offerings, but when we come to the primary livelihood of  
families, the design of a plausible randomized trial is far from being credible.  
The earlier working paper of Karlan and Zinman has greater detail and I quote from it 
below. The basic problem is that the sample response is just not plausible, especially 
given the highest scientific standards that are to be attained.The credibility of the 
individuals in the sample, whether it be their veracity or their memory one cannot tell, is 
put into question by the following
25: “More than half of respondents known, from the 
Lender’s data, to have a loan outstanding from the Lender in the month before the survey 
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do not report having a loan from the Lender …. Nearly half do not report any outstanding 
formal sector loan.”  
The working paper differs in reporting positively about the effect of the micro-loans on 
the businesses that borrowed.
26
 “Profit is arguably the most important outcome, as it is 
arguably the closest thing we have to a summary statistic on the success of the business 
and its ability to generate resources for the household. The full sample point estimate on 
last month’s profits is positive and nontrivial in magnitude a roughly $50 US increase, 
compared to a sample mean of about $500.” There is approximately a 10% increase in 
profits. 
This is replaced in the published article with the statement that “Results for three other 
proxies for business size and success—total profits, gross sales, and inventory—are 
noisy”. The reason for the noise may well be the peculiar behavior they note below27. 
“ microentrepreneurs used credit to re-optimize business  investment in a way that 
produced smaller, lower-cost, and more profitable businesses. Profits increase in an 
absolute sense, suggesting that many microentrepreneurs employ workers with negative 
net productivity, and raising the question of why (and in particular, of why access to 
credit led them to reduce employment and increase profits).” This is a very important 
question for a ‘gold standard’---we have a sample which needs loans in order to fire 
unproductive workers--- is this a credible sample? We are told that ‘ The various results 
below relating to risk management suggest an explanation that we discuss below.’ A 
reading of this discussion fails to illuminate the problem. Angus Deaton has pointed out a 
limitation of RCT’s that is ever-present, yet invisible28.  
RCTs are so highly regarded because people assume that the randomness of the 
selection eliminates bias. What people don’t talk about is that there are actually 
two stages of selection. The first stage, in which researchers start with the entire 
population, and choose a group which will in the second stage be randomly 
divided into the study and control groups, is NOT random. Selection in the first 
stage may be determined by convenience or politics, and therefore may not be 
representative of the entire population. At the same time, the studied populations 
in RCTs are actually very small, which means that an outlier in the experimental 
group can have a huge distortionary effect: 
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There must be some reason why the experimentalists are unwilling to say that ‘we are 
trying but have yet to learn anything useful’; instead of casting doubts about the logic of 
microcredit, they should just wait till they have something to credibly justify the ‘gold 
standard’ label on experimental work they have arrogated to their own evaluations of 
microfinance. 
 
The paper of Bannerjee et al ,”The Miracle of Microfinance?”, begins by noting the 
arguments of critics who find the existing evidence unsatisfactory and who even claim 
that MF achieves the opposite if its intentions
29
 
 
the critics of microfinance .. fear that it is displacing more effective anti-poverty 
measures or even contributing to over-borrowing and therefore even greater long 
term poverty. 
 
Initially doubt is cast upon the extant methods for determining the effect of MF 
 
The problem is that microfinance clients are self-selected and therefore not 
comparable to non-clients. Microfinance organizations also purposively chose 
some villages and not others. Difference in difference estimates can control for 
fixed differences between clients and non-clients, but it is likely that those who 
choose join MFIs would be on different trajectories even absent 
microfinance….there is so far no consensus among academics on the impact of 
microcredit.  
 
Such doubts allow us to appreciate the need for  a more scientific approach. One can 
hardly deny the need for more science and perhaps it is even possible to obtain it. But the 
execution of this good intention by such recognized experts is such that it raises questions 
about the validity of the science in this context
30
.  
 
Given the complexity of this identification problem, the ideal experiment to 
estimate the effect of microcredit appears to be to randomly assign microcredit to 
some areas, and not some others, and compare outcomes in both sets of areas: 
randomization would ensure that the only difference between residents of these 
areas is the greater ease of access to microcredit in the treatment area.  
 
The specific application of RCT is to an area of India in Hyderabad and the lead  MFI in 
question is called Spandana. However, there are two  critical facts about Spandana noted 
by the authors but left without comment
31 
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Groups are formed by women themselves, not by Spandana. Spandana does not 
determine loan eligibility by the expected productivity of the investment….Also, 
Spandana does not insist on transformation in the household (unlike Grameen). 
Spandana is primarily a lending organization, not directly involved in business 
training, financial literacy promotion, etc.  
 
In other words, Spandana neither takes steps to encourage economic efficiency nor does 
it attempt to transform the poor individual’s  habits or culture. A priori, we should then 
have no expectation of either economic gains or of intertemporal benefits. What then are 
we measuring? 
 
RCT is then applied to entire communities 
32. “Treatment communities were randomly 
selected to receive Spandana branches,”. Now this is really puzzling. Randomisation of 
treatments  over otherwise homogeneous entities , can be expected to give us 
information. Why entire communities  should be considered thus homogeneous is not at 
all clear. If it is because variable like income, age structure, location etc have been 
‘neutralised’, why can we not ‘homogenise’ with exactly these  variables in a standard 
econometric exercise? It is as though we took a cross section of all poor countries and 
randomly gave them foreign aid , and then evaluated the results as a scientific. 
 
The authors identify only one direct mode for the impact of MF---the provision of the 
fixed cost for starting a business
33
. 
 
The need to purchase assets and working capital constitutes a fixed cost of 
starting a business, and one impact of microfinance may be that it enables 
households who would not or could not pay this fixed cost without borrowing, to 
become entrepreneurs…. 
In the case of 30% of Spandana loans the reported purpose was starting a new 
business; 22% were supposed to be used to buy stock for existing business, 30% 
to repay an existing loan,15% to buy a durable for household use, and 15% to 
smooth household consumption.  
 
Would it not have been easy to actually find out how real these fixed costs are? If the 
assets in question are readily resalable, they are fixed costs but not sunk costs, so are they 
very much of an impediment? Informal lenders, family or friends, could take collateral 
stake and lower the size of the lump. Note that only 30% of the sample are starting a new 
business, supposedly the primary goal of MF in the model. But why even expect that the 
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empirical results will be notable when the effects in question are expected only from 30% 
of the treated individuals?  
 
The conclusions reached are quite to be expected.
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While microcredit succeeds in affecting household expenditure and creating and 
expanding businesses, it appears to have no discernible effect on education, 
health, or women’s empowerment. 
 
The authors give little space to the fact that businesses were able to expand, presumably 
the rationale for a loan; since the MFI, Spandana, is a ‘credit only’ MFI, the second set of 
results about education, health, or women’s decision-making  is even more to be expected 
The real surprise lies in the readiness of the authors to draw a conclusion from such a 
study, 
 
Microcredit therefore may not be the “miracle” that is sometimes claimed on its 
behalf, but it does allow households to borrow, invest, and create and expand 
businesses.  
 
The most important question---the expected productivity of the loan---has not been asked, 
the randomization is over an complex entity and so the value of randomization is largely 
negated, and conclusions are ‘tested’ for areas such as health, which are irrelevant to the 
MFI! If the leaders in a field provide such weak output, how applicable is the method? 
Perhaps RCT should be limited for now to such areas as devising effective marketing 
strategies for new products?  
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V. Conclusion 
Economists who comment on practical policy issues automatically acquire a 
responsibility. Given that some thirty million in Bangladesh alone rely upon 
Microfinance, one would hope that comments and evaluations of MF in Bangladesh 
would display both caution and moderation. The insouciance of economists about policy 
is apparent in their refusal to probe the impact of the self-selection bias that arises when 
we examine only the MFI members. They may be more entrepreneurial and disciplined 
than the general population so we cannot extrapolate from the benefits gained by them. 
Just because this self-chosen sample can arise out of poverty through MF, does not mean 
that the entire village population can do so. Well and good. What has this to say about 
actual policy? There are some 70,000 villages in rural Bangladesh; suppose some 10 
families self-select and rise out of poverty. This makes 700,000 families or about 3.5 
million poor who escape penury. No government resources are used to attain this; of late, 
the figures suggest that no donor funds are needed also. So it is a sustainable anti-poverty 
program. Are we to raise our eyebrows because it self-selection bias? 
Surprisingly, the issue can have an a priori clarity simply by viewing Microfinance as 
finance. What do the ex ante and ex post rates of return tell us when compared with the 
rates of interest people are asked to pay? Why this has not been done emphatically and as 
the first order of business is a real puzzle
35
. As a result, a fog has descended upon the 
subject. The fuzzy vision encouraged by this fog has allowed a vague skepticism to 
prevail, as though the burden of proof  lay with Microfinance, rather than the other way 
around. The deference to RCT as the only worthwhile test is visible in the recent 
review/evaluation of Microfinance by UKAid
36
. Such a climate of  knowledgable 
sneering may well have contributed to the removal of Dr Yunus from the control of 
Grameen Bank and opened the dismal possibility of Grameen being turned into a 
Government organization. Even if the Government of Bangladesh can find bureaucrats 
with the competence to run Grameen successfully, do such efficient bureaucrats not have 
better things to do?  When the livelihoods of many millions are at stake, if the data are 
unavailable or inadequate for speaking with clarity, it is best to go back to first principles 
to decide our actions.
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Table 1 : Potential small business enterprises 
Potential small business 
enterprises 
Average capital 
requirement 
Average 
estimated 
profit/month   
Average 
estimated 
profit/Year   
Profit Rate 
per Year 
(%) 
Average 
Person 
Requirement 
Advertisement  business 100000 70000 840000 840.00 5 
Boutique/ Embroidery shop 69393 13075 156900 226.10 4 
Bag business 48333 11000 132000 273.11 3 
Bamboo business 60000 53500 642000 1070.00 4 
Beauty parlor business 51666 10333 123996 240.00 3 
Brick/sand business 60000 9333 111996 186.66 3 
Business(Halim+Chotpoti) 80000 16000 192000 240.00 2 
Buying machine for juice 
sugarcane 
20000 7000 84000 420.00 2 
Buying rickshaw for renting 32257 10297 123564 383.06 2 
Buying pushcart 17500 5000 60000 342.86 1 
Buy van 15000 3125 37500 250.00 1 
CD/ VCD shop 58750 9000 108000 183.83 1 
Candle factory 100000 15000 180000 180.00 4 
Cattle business 38600 8550 102600 265.80 3 
Churi business 30000 3000 36000 120.00 2 
Cloth /Shari business 48338 8963 107556 222.51 2 
Contract bidding  100000 5000 60000 60.00  
Cosmetics business*** 85000 13000 156000 183.53 2    
Dairy farm 61428 6857 82284 133.95 4 
Egg business 40000 10000 120000 300.00 3 
Electric shop 70500 13300 159600 226.38 2 
Fish selling 62105 13960 167520 269.74 1 
Flexi load business 50000 5000 60000 120.00 1 
Flower business 50000 10000 120000 240.00 1 
Fruits business 47000 13725 164700 350.43 1 
Furniture shop 66250 13500 162000 244.53 3 
Garment business 62500 18750 225000 360.00  
General store 55250 11666 139992 253.38 3 
Generator business 60000 5000 60000 100.00 2 
Gold refiner shop 60000 8000 96000 160.00 3 
Grocery shop 62710  10783  129396 206.34 1 
Hen selling 37500 9500 114000 304.00 2 
Hotel business*** 62678 14111 169332 270.16 5    
28 
 
Potential small business 
enterprises 
Average capital 
requirement 
Average 
estimated 
profit/month   
Average 
estimated 
profit/Year   
Profit Rate 
per Year 
(%) 
Average 
Person 
Requirement 
Ice business 50000 6000 72000 144.00 4 
Investment in transport business 72580 13096 157152 216.52 2 
Rod/Iron/Tin shop 67500 12500 150000 222.22 2 
Jewelry shop 100000 20000 240000 240.00 3 
Jharu business 25000 12000 144000 576.00 2 
Juice factory 100000 25000 300000 300.00  
Karchupi business 50000 5000 60000 120.00 2 
Land (broker) business 55555 6157 73884 132.99 1 
Land lease 51153 8769 105228 205.71 1 
Laundry shop 100000 12000 144000 144.00 2 
Leather business 50000 40000 480000 960.00 5 
Library shop 50000 5000 60000 120.00 2 
Mushroom business 50000 5000 60000 120.00 1 
Meal business 44000 8400 100800 229.09 2 
Meat business 65833 14500 174000 264.31 1 
Motor parts business 73333 14166 169992 231.81 2 
Nursery business 10000 70000 840000 8400.00 3 
Oven factory 100000 20000 240000 240.00 5 
Pan/Biri business 37500 8750 105000 280.00 1 
Paper business 75000 8000 96000 128.00 1 
Pharmacy 42500 7500 90000 211.76 2 
Phohe/fax 68333 10611 127332 186.34 1 
Pitha business 40000 6000 72000 180.00 1 
Plastic business 64000 11200 134400 210.00 2 
Poultry farm 69411 11000 132000 190.17 5 
Raw material business 45400 7616 91392 201.30 2 
Rice selling 61818 14272 171264 277.05 2 
Rickshaw garage 65357 14142 169704 259.66 4 
Rickshaw renting business 40484 12506 150072 370.69 2 
Saloon business 48333 5416 64992 134.47 2 
Scrap material business 73333 14333 171996 234.54 1 
Shoe shop 83333 13333 159996 192.00 2 
Tailoring shop 54285 11057 132684 244.42 2 
Tea stall 36038 7442 89304 247.81 1 
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Potential small business 
enterprises 
Average capital 
requirement 
Average 
estimated 
profit/month   
Average 
estimated 
profit/Year   
Profit Rate 
per Year 
(%) 
Average 
Person 
Requirement 
Tiler khaza business 20000 5000 60000 300.00 1 
Vegetable business 45714 11857 142284 311.25 1 
Want to go abroad 51100 10555 126660 247.87  
Wood business 50500 24925 299100 592.28 3 
Workshop 52500 8333 99996 190.47  
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1
 A casual search will show that of the more than 10,000 entries on MF on the web, about 
one-third are skeptical. I am most struck by the fact that most educated youth I talked to 
in Bangladesh were skeptical of MF---but could not give me any cogent reason why. 
Typically, they just refer to interest rates, donor influence, or circulation of loans in a 
pyramid scheme---all without proof. 
2
 There is a peculiar disconnect in that the prerequisites for finance are lucidly described 
in several articles---see Guttman, who in turn draws on Ghatak and Guinnanae, but this 
does not seem to have extended to the evaluations of MF. 
3
 Two students, one from Peru and the other from S. Korea, have walked into my office 
and said they wanted to study Development economics. When I asked why, each said “ I 
heard a speech of Dr Yunus”. Such experiences can be multiplied manyfold.  
4
 ‘Banerjee vs Deaton at NYU’ http://nyudri.org/initiatives/deaton-v-banerjee/.  
5
 I will have repeated occasion to illustrate the point made by Deaton in his debate with 
Banerjee, ‘Context is everything’. 
6
 My experience began in 1978 when I did a study of the Rickshaw industry for the BIDS 
and I have kept up a continuing interest in them. In 2009 I wrote an article for the daily 
NEW AGE which encapsulates all my principal arguments and I will borrow heavily 
from it below. 
7
 Jonathan Swift ran a viable MFI in Ireland in the 1720’s and Dugald Stewart noted the 
high productivity of small loans in his lectures in Edinburgh in the 1790’s. Neither the 
sustainability of MFI’s nor the spiked productivity of small loans, is new. 
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8
  Berger (2006) notes that the MF industry had been growing at about 30 per cent per 
year and that profitability was at par with that of major international banks, pp5, 17. 
9
 Some recent results, such as those of Becchetti and Castriota (2011) are easily 
interpreted in this fashion, i.e. diminishing returns to capital. 
10
 I have been unable to get exactly the answers I want, despite corresponding with the 
SBA and with other scholars, so I am relying on internet sites like the following: 
http://www.ces.census.gov/docs/bds/release/tab_fage_release.xls   
http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview/id/418119.html 
11
 If there is a micro-macro paradox, so that programs beneficial at the micro level fail to 
show beneficial effects at the macro level, a fruitful research program will ask what 
accounts for this. 
12
 Proponents of MF have made excessive claims on its behalf, but no more so than any 
one else trying to get the public to focus on an important issue.   
13
  Students at Independent University Bangladesh are required to visit and spend some 
time in a village. Reading a sample of  the reports of these students over the last 15 years 
clearly supports this observation. 
14
 Solomon Tadese and Jinmao Wang have written suggestive articles on these issues. 
15
 The list of evaluations is probably too long to note but the most influential are those of 
Hossain (1988) and of Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
16
 The history of the Grameen bank actually makes the comparisons easier, since several 
early choices were made for the Grameen bank. However, and this bolsters the general 
point made in the paper, these are details that cannot be had from the general statistics of 
any MFI.  
17
 “Evaluating SME support programs in Chile using Panel Firm Data”  World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 5082  by Hong  Tan,  
18
 See the papers of Deninger and Liu for studies of Indian Self Help groups. Again, the 
literature on health and education impacts is too large to quote. 
19
  A recent paper of Buera et al (2012) has embedded MF in a general equilibrium 
framework, but the constraints of tractable modeling and equilibrium are such that few of 
the factors relevant to Bangladesh are captured.  
20
 "Thresholds in the Process of International Financial Integration" ,IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 4133 m. Ayhan Kose, Eswar Prasad,, Ashley Taylor,  
21
 This does not mean that the changes they make are necessarily for the better---just that 
MFI’s are goal and practice oriented, rather than rule-bound. 
22
 Mary Kay Gugerty “The Effectiveness of National NGO Self‐Regulation: Theory and 
Evidence from Africa,” Public Administration and Development, 28: 105‐118, May 2008.  
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23
 Other critiques, which serve to modify but not fundamentally question the value of MF, 
come from Behavioral economics. See Mulianathan and Thaler (2000) and Mullainathan 
(2009) 
24
 An earlier paper of  Mckernan(2002) also adopted a quasi-experimental approach but 
makes much more qualified claims. 
25
 Karlan and Zinman, p11 
26
 Op cit., p12 
27
 Op.cit.,p13 
28
 http://nyudri.org/initiatives/deaton-v-banerjee/. In correspondence, Angus Deaton has 
said that the representation of his points are correct, if imprecise.  
29
 Bannerjee et al (2009), p1 
30
  op cit p2 
31
 op cit p4 
32
 op cit p7 
33
 op cit p8—order of quotes reversed 
34
 op cit p21. 
35
 Two ways to clarify the issue, not decisively but suggestively, are an ABM model and 
a CGE model. An initial attempt at ABM modeling is in Rashid, Yoon and Kashem 
(2011), but a proper CGE model awaits.   
36
 Duvendack et al (2011). The deference to RCT is also visible in the recent issue of 
World Development (2011), ed Hermes and Leisnik ,v39 ,no 6.  
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